





























Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Fennell, J. (2014). Morale and Combat Performance: An Introduction. Journal of Strategic Studies.
10.1080/01402390.2013.849395
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 18. Feb. 2017
	  An edited version of this paper appeared in 
 Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 37: 6-7, pp. 796-798. 
 
This can be found here: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2013.849395#abstract 
 
Morale and Combat Performance: An Introduction 
 
© Dr Jonathan Fennell  
Defence Studies Department,  



















Morale	  and	  Combat	  Performance	  
Introduction	  	  What	   makes	   soldiers	   fight?	   This	   question	   has	   interested	   historians	   since	   the	  dawn	  of	  war	  itself.	  The	  contributions	  of	  anthropology,	  psychology	  and	  sociology	  to	   the	   study	   of	   combat	   in	   the	   twentieth	   century	   have	   greatly	   deepened	   our	  understanding	   of	   morale	   and	   combat	   motivation.	   The	   publication	   of	   John	  Keegan’s	   seminal	  The	   Face	   of	   Battle	   in	   1976,	   together	  with	   an	   upsurge	   of	   oral	  history,	   has	   stimulated	   a	   generation	   of	   scholarship	   on	  what	   Paul	   Kennedy	   has	  called	  ‘war	  from	  below’:	  individuals'	  experience	  of	  fighting.1	  As	  a	  result,	  we	  know	  better	  than	  ever	  before	  what	  put	  the	  average	  soldier	   in	  his	  slit	  trench	  and	  kept	  him	   there.2	   What	   remains	   poorly	   understood,	   however,	   is	   the	   connection	  between	  individuals'	  combat	  motivation,	  the	  morale	  of	  a	  unit	  or	  formation,	  and	  success	  and	  failure	  on	  the	  battlefield.	  	  	  The	   articles	   gathered	   together	   in	   this	   special	   issue	   of	   the	   Journal	   of	   Strategic	  
Studies	  are	  the	  product	  of	  a	  colloquium	  at	  King’s	  College	  London	  in	  April	  2011.	  The	  historians,	  sociologists	  and	  psychologists	  present	  were	  faced	  with	  a	  number	  of	   clear	   challenges.	   How	   should	   morale	   be	   defined?	   Can	   it	   be	   ‘measured’	   or	  assessed	   accurately?	   How	   does	   morale	   fit	   into	   a	   holistic	   and	   nuanced	  understanding	  of	  what	   leads	   to	   success	   in	  battle	   and	  war	  more	  generally?	  The	  approach	  that	  emerged	  then,	  and	  that	  is	  presented	  in	  these	  articles,	  incorporates	  three	  main	  strands.	  First,	  the	  essays	  share	  a	  common	  concept	  of	  morale.	  Instead	  of	   associating	   morale	   solely	   or	   primarily	   with	   affective	   states	   (psychological	  orientations	  that	  are	  an	  expression	  of	  or	  dependent	  on	  emotions	  or	  feelings)	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  John	  Keegan,	  The	  Face	  of	  Battle	  (London,	  1976);	  Paul	  Kennedy,	  ‘History	  from	  the	  Middle:	  The	  Case	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War’,	  Journal	  of	  Military	  History	  Vol.	  74	  (January	  2010),	  p.	  35.	  2	  See	  for	  example:	  Paul	  Addison,	  and	  Angus	  Calder,	  (eds.),	  Time	  to	  Kill:	  The	  Soldier’s	  Experience	  of	  
War	  in	  the	  West	  1939-­‐1945	  (London,	  1997);	  John	  Ellis,	  The	  Sharp	  End:	  The	  Fighting	  Man	  in	  World	  
War	  II	  (London,	  1993;	  first	  published	  1980);	  Omer	  Bartov,	  The	  Eastern	  Front,	  1941-­‐45:	  German	  
Troops	  and	  the	  Barbarisation	  of	  Warfare	  (Oxford,	  1985);	  John	  W.	  Dower,	  War	  Without	  Mercy:	  
Race	  and	  Power	  in	  the	  Pacific	  War,	  (London,	  1986);	  Gerald	  F.	  Linderman,	  The	  World	  Within	  War:	  
American	  Combat	  Experience	  in	  World	  War	  II	  (London,	  1997);	  Sam	  C.	  Sarkessian	  (ed.),	  Combat	  
Effectiveness:	  Cohesion,	  Stress,	  and	  the	  Volunteer	  Military	  (London,	  1980);	  Catherine	  Merridale,	  
Ivan’s	  War:	  The	  Red	  Army	  1939-­‐45	  (London,	  2005);	  Mark	  Johnston,	  Australian	  Soldiers	  and	  their	  
Adversaries	  in	  World	  War	  II	  (Cambridge,	  2000);	  The	  ‘Combat	  Morale’	  Special	  Edition	  of	  the	  
Journal	  of	  Contemporary	  History,	  Vol.	  41,	  No.	  2	  (2006).	  
group	  dynamics,	  they	  develop	  and	  explore	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  and	  functional	  understanding	   of	   morale	   that	   links	   it	   closely	   with	   motivation.	   Secondly,	   the	  essays	   tackle	   the	   problems	   of	   sources	   and	   methodologies.	   Too	   many	  assessments	  of	  morale	   rely	  on	  anecdotal	   evidence	  or	  a	  very	   limited	  number	  of	  accounts	  or	  sources.	  By	  making	  use	  of	  previously	  under-­‐explored	  sources,	  such	  as	   censorship	   summaries	   of	   soldiers’	  mail	   and	   intelligence	   reports,	   the	   essays	  offer	  a	  broader	  assessment	  of	  morale.	  They	   identify	  an	   intricate	  web	  of	   factors	  that	   can	   be	   considered	   when	   studying	   morale.	   Some	   of	   these	   factors	   are	  primarily	   outcomes	   or	   correlates	   of	  morale	   (e,g,	   numbers	   of	   prisoners	   of	  war,	  rates	   of	   desertion,	   sickness	   and	   battle	   exhaustion).	   Others	   are	   influencers	   or	  determinants	   of	   morale	   (e.g.	   weapons,	   quality	   of	   manpower	   and	   the	   primary	  group).	  All	  are	  amenable	  to	  qualitative	  analysis;	  some,	  however,	  are	  also	  readily	  assessable	   by	   more	   quantitative	   approaches.	   By	   integrating	   qualitative	   and	  quantitative	   analysis	   of	   the	   many	   factors	   that	   are	   associated	   with	   morale,	   a	  detailed	  picture	  of	  the	  degree	  of	  good	  or	  bad	  morale	  emerges.	  Thirdly,	  the	  essays	  analyse	   the	   link	  between	  morale	  and	  combat	  performance.	  The	  more	  complete	  picture	   of	   morale	   that	   emerges	   from	   this	   methodological	   approach	   can	   be	  compared	  with	  known	  battlefield	  performance.	  This	  allows	  the	  development	  of	  a	  clear	   and	   supportable	   narrative	   plotting	   the	   relationship	   between	  morale	   and	  military	  outcomes.	  	  	  These	  essays,	   therefore,	  provide	  a	  contribution	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  morale	  in	  war.	  The	  methodology	  and	  approaches	  employed	  build	  on	  the	  work	  of	  other	  scholars3	   and	   offer	   a	   way	   of	   integrating	   morale	   into	   an	   analysis	   of	   combat	  performance	   and	   strategy.	   This,	   it	   is	   hoped,	   will	   help	   military	   practitioners,	  theorists	   and	   policy	  makers	   better	   understand	   the	   factors	   that	   lead	   to	   victory	  and	  defeat	  on	  the	  battlefield	  and	  in	  war	  more	  generally.	  Each	  author	  explores	  a	  case	  study	  from	  the	  two	  world	  wars	  and	  analyses	  to	  what	  extent	  morale	  can	  be	  considered	   an	   important	   factor	   in	   determining	   victory	   and	   defeat.	   Jonathan	  Fennell,	   by	   studying	   the	   North	   African	   campaign	   of	   the	   Second	   World	   War,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  See,	  for	  example,	  David	  French,	  ‘”Tommy	  is	  no	  soldier”:	  The	  morale	  of	  the	  second	  British	  army	  in	  Normandy,	  June-­‐August	  1944’	  in	  the	  Journal	  of	  Strategic	  Studies,	  Vol.	  19,	  No.	  4	  (1996);	  John	  Buckley,	  British	  Armour	  in	  the	  Normandy	  Campaign	  1944	  (Abingdon,	  2004),	  Chapter	  Eight.	  
explores	   the	   relationship	  between	  morale	  and	   strategy.	  Vanda	  Wilcox	  explores	  the	  role	  of	  morale	  in	  the	  disaster	  that	  beset	  the	  Italian	  Army	  at	  Caporetto	  in	  1917	  and	   Jonathan	   Boff	   reassesses	   the	   part	   played	   by	   morale	   in	   the	   defeat	   of	   the	  German	  Army	  in	  late	  1918	  and	  the	  revolution	  that	  followed.	  	  	  War,	  as	  these	  essays	  make	  clear,	  is	  a	  human	  endeavour.	  A	  critical	  analysis	  of	  the	  past,	   present	   and	   future	   must,	   therefore,	   fully	   engage	   with	   this	   reality.	   It	   is	  incumbent	   on	   scholars,	   practitioners	   and	   policy	   makers	   to	   develop	  methodologies	   and	   approaches	   to	   better	   understand	   the	   human	   component	   in	  war.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	  hoped	   that	   these	  essays	  make	  a	   contribution	   to	   that	  end.	  We	  would	  do	  well	  to	  consider	  again	  the	  words	  of	  S.L.A.	  Marshall,	  	   We	  have	  come	  through	  another	  great	  war	  and	  its	  reality	   is	  already	  cloaked	  in	  the	   mists	   of	   peace.	   In	   the	   course	   of	   that	   war	   we	   learned	   anew	   that	   man	   is	  supreme,	  that	  it	  is	  the	  soldier	  who	  fights	  who	  wins	  battles,	  that	  fighting	  means	  using	  a	  weapon,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  the	  heart	  of	  man	  which	  controls	  this	  use.	  4	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  S.L.A.	  Marshall,	  Men	  Against	  Fire,	  The	  Problem	  of	  Battle	  Command	  in	  Future	  War	  (New	  York,	  1966),	  p.	  23.	  
